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Sociologists have long been concerned with the origin, purpose, and
application of the criminal law.I Due in part to the feminist movement 2
recent research has focused on the purpose and application of laws
prohibiting sexual assault.3 This research signals an important shift in
the focus and assumptions underlying criminological research. Implic-
itly, traditional research 4 and theory5 have assumed that criminal events
* Revision of a paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of
Criminology, November 7-10, 1979, Philadelphia, Pa. This research was partially funded by
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Grant No. 76-NI-99-0071. We thank Marion
County, Indiana law enforcement officials for their permission and assistance in collecting
these data. Neither the funding agency nor Marion County law enforcement officials bears
any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented herein.
** Assistant Professor, University of Georgia. Ph.D., Indiana University, 1977; M.A., Uni-
versity of Massachusetts, 1973; B.A., University of Michigan, 1970.
*** Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico. Ph.D., Indiana University, 1979; M.A.,
Indiana University, 1975; B.A., Indiana University, 1973.
I See W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER, AND POWER (1971); R. Q.UINNEY,
CRITIQUE OF LEGAL ORDER (1973); T. SELLIN, CULTURE, CONFLICT, AND CRIME (1938); A.
TURK, CRIMINALITY AND LEGAL ORDER (1969).
2 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FORCIBLE
RAPE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE RESPONSE BY PROSECUTORS (1977); Largen, Histor of
Women s Movement in Changing Attitudes, Laws, and Treatment Toward Rape Victims, in SEXUAL
ASSAULT: THE VICTIM & THE RAPIST (M. Walker & S. Brodsky eds. 1976).
3 See L. CLARK & D. LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY (1977); L.
HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE: INSTITUTIONAL REACTIONS (1978);
LaFree, The Eect of Sexual Stratfication by Race on Olfical Reactions to Rape, 45 AM. Soc. REV.
842 (1980). In this article, sexual assault is a generic term for forcible sex offenses such as
rape, sodomy, and assault and battery with intent to rape or gratify. Although the feminist-
conflict perspective focuses most explicitly on forcible rape, the general thrust of their argu-
ment and its implicit assumptions apply as well to other felonies involving forcible
intercourse.
4 See Bernstein, Kelly & Doyle, Societal Reaction to Deviants.- The Case of Criminal Defendants,
42 AM. Soc. REV. 743 (1977); Chiricos & Waldo, Socioeconomic Status and Criminal Sentencing: An
Empirical Assessment ofa Conflict Proposition, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 753 (1975); Lizotte, Extra-legal
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are sufficiently similar to allow us to distinguish among them, and
among official reactions to them, solely on the basis of an underlying
dimension of seriousness. This assumption has led researchers to draw
few qualitalive comparisons among events or reactions to them.
In contrast, the more recent feminist-conflict research has implicitly
assumed that sexual assaults differ qualitatively from other crimes and
that official reactions differ accordingly. These assumptions are logical
extensions of the feminist-conflict argument that laws against sexual as-
sault developed to protect the property rights of males in the sexual and
reproductive functions of women.6 Proponents of the feminist-conflict
view argue that the legal system continues to protect these rights, and
the institution of sexual property on which they are based, by protecting
only certain types of victims. Protection therefore extends to "valuable"
women-women who conform to sex-role stereotypes or who are valua-
ble as sexual property, either potentially (e.g., virgins, the young) or
actually (e.g., married women). Less "valuable" women or women who
deviate from traditional sex roles are less likely to receive the protection
of the criminal law.
Feminist-conflict theorists find support for these contentions in em-
pirical work that documents a pervasive skepticism on the part of offi-
cials toward rape claims. 7 Research shows that officials react less
severely to defendants accused of raping women who are black 8 and of
lower socioeconomic status.9 Officials also tend to react less severely
(e.g., by dismissing cases) to defendants when the women they are ac-
cused of raping have "bad" reputations,10 live in nontraditional ar-
Factors in Chicago's Criminal Courts: Testing the Confict Model of CriminalJustice, 25 Soc. PROBS.
564 (1978). For a review, see Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencinq." A Critical Evalu-
ation ofthe Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 783 (1981).
5 See H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOQY OF DEVIANCE (1963); E.
SCHUR, LABELING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: ITS SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS (1971).
6 See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); L.
CLARK & D. LEWIS, supra note 3; R. COLLINS, CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY (1975); LeGrand, Rape
and Rape Laws." Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1973); Note, The Victim in a
Forcible Rape Case.- 4 Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335 (1973).
7 See, e.g., L. CLARK & D. LEWIS, supra note 3; N. GAGNER & C. SCHURR, SEXUAL AS-
SAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA (1976); L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, supra note
3; BohmerJudicial1ttitudes toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303 (1974); Burt & Albin,
Rape Myths, Rape Defmition, and Probability of Conviction, 11 J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 212 (1981);
LaFree, supra note 3; Landau, Rape.- The Victim as Defendant, TRIAL, July-Aug. 1974, at 19.
8 See, e.g., LaFree, Variables Afecting Guilty Pleas and Convictions in Rape Cases: Toward a
Social Theo,7 of Rape Processing, 58 Soc. FORCES 833 (1980); Comment, Police Discretion and the
Judgement that a Crime Has Been Committed- Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 302-
07 (1968).
9 See L. CLARK & D. LEWIS, supra note 3.




rangements," were hitchhiking, 12 were drinking at the time of the
offense or are identified as chronic alcohol abusers, 13 or had been sexu-
ally intimate with the defendant prior to the crime. 14
Feminist-conflict theory and research argues, then, that official re-
actions to sexual assault depend on assessments of the victim's sexual
property value and conformity to traditional sex-role expectations. By
implication, reactions to other crimes do not. depend on such assess-
ments. This is so in part because these considerations are largely irrele-
vant to the origin and purpose of laws prohibiting other behaviors. This
crucial assumption has led most research on sexual assault 15 to focus
exclusively on sexual assaults and reactions thereto. Explicit compari-
sons with other crimes are rare, and are limited by the specific official
reactions and variables examined. 16
In short, traditional criminological research is based on assump-
tions that conflict with those underlying more recent work on sexual
assault. Although these differing assumptions are central to an accurate
understanding of the operation of the criminal law, there has been no
empirical examination of their validity. We consider such an examina-
tion essential because of its implications for both research and theory. If
official reactions to crime are essentially dissimilar, and therefore do not
depend simply on the seriousness of crimes, then the qualitative differ-
ences among criminal events deserve empirical study. Essential dissimi-
larity in official reactions would also identify major inadequacies in
existing theories, which remain generally inattentive to the unique fea-
tures of crimes that may warrant markedly different official responses.
Essential dissimilarity would underscore the need for either a more com-
plex general theory in which qualitative aspects of criminal action figure
prominently or a set of special theories (e.g., the feminist-conflict theory
11 See, e.g., L. CLARK & D. LEwis, supra note 3; L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, supra note
3.
12 See, e.g., L. BRODYAGA, M. GATES, S. SINGER, M. TUCKER & R. WHITE, RAPE AND
ITS VICTIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS, HEALTH FACILITIES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AGENCIES, (1975); Nelson & Amir, The Hitchhike Victim of Rape." A Research Report, in 5 VIc-
TIMOLOGY: A NEW Focus (I. Drapkin & E. Viano eds. 1975).
13 See, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 11; Williams, The Effects of Victim Character-
istics on the Disposition of Violent Crimes, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM (W. McDon-
ald ed. 1976).
14 See, e.g., M. AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE (1971); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
supra note 10.
15 See, e.g., S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS OF
RESEARCH FINDINGS (1979).
16 See, e.g., K. WILLIAMS, THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM IN THE PROSECUTION OF VIOLENT
CRIMES (1978), who confines her attention to four offenses (homicide, aggravated assault,
robbery, and sexual assault) and to the role that victim (rather than the defendant or offense)
characteristics play during prosecution.
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of sexual assault) valid for official reactions to some, but not other,
crimes.
If, on the other hand, official reactions are essentially similar, then
whatever the unique origins and purposes of criminal laws, we cannot
automatically assume that the application of such laws is correspond-
ingly unique. The relationship between origin, purpose, and actual ap-
plication of the law then becomes complex rather than straightforward
and deserves greater empirical and theoretical attention than it has
received.
To examine these possibilities, we obtained data from a sample of
defendants charged with felonies in Indiana. We used these data to an-
swer two questions that bear on the conflicting assumptions underlying
traditional research and empirical work on sexual assault. First, do out-
comes for defendants accused of sexual assault differ from outcomes for
defendants accused of other types of offenses? That is, once relevant
case differences (e.g., evidentiary strength) are controlled, are defend-
ants accused of sexual assault treated more leniently than defendants
accused of other offenses? Second, do the determinants or predictors of
sexual assault outcomes differ significantly from the determinants or
predictors of outcomes for other types of offenses? Based on prior re-
search and theorizing, we expected that victim attributes and behaviors,
particularly those indicative of sexual property value or sex-role con-
formity, would play a prominent role in affecting the outcomes of sexual
assault cases. Conversely, we expected these attributes and behaviors to
play a much more limited role in affecting the outcomes of other types
of cases.
While our primary interest centered on victim attributes and be-
haviors, analysis also included defendant attributes and behaviors,
measures of evidence, and indicators of the social and physical context
within which the crime occurred. We examined the differential role of
victim characteristics and these other factors in determining four out-
comes: the decision to dismiss rather than fully prosecute, the decision
to plead guilty rather than proceed to trial, the verdict or finding at
trial, and the type of sentence imposed on the convicted, whether incar-
ceration or a more lenient sanction.
For each of these four outcomes, we compared defendants accused
of sexual assault with defendants accused of other violent crimes and
defendants accused of property crimes. Three additional, more specific
comparisons were drawn between defendants accused of sexual assault
and those accused of other assaults, robbery, and burglary.
As the following sections will show, we found no consistent ten-
dency for defendants accused of sexual assault to receive lenient treat-
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ment, once factors such as victim characteristics and evidence were
controlled. Moreover, most comparisons revealed no significant differ-
ence in the role that victim attributes, as well as other characteristics,
play in affecting outcomes. Different treatment of defendants accused of
sexual assault occurred in three of twenty possible instances. The sen-
tencing of defendants convicted of sexual assault differed from the sen-
tencing of defendants convicted of other violent crimes and of robbery,
and the guilty plea decision for defendants accused of sexual assault dif-
fered from the guilty plea decision for defendants accused of property
crimes. Contrary to expectation, these differences were seldom due to
differences in the effect that victim characteristics had on outcomes.
Rather, they tended to involve differences in the effect of defendant
characteristics, the context of the crime, and evidence.
In short, victim attributes and behavior did not play a more promi-
nent role when prosecuting sexual assaults. Nor was their role more lim-
ited when prosecuting other types of crimes. Instead, victim
characteristics, some of which indicate sexual property value and sex-
role conformity, affected outcomes regardless of the offense of which the
defendant was accused or convicted.
II. METHODS AND SAMPLE
A. SAMPLE
Our sample consisted of 945 defendants charged with felonies in
Marion County (Indianapolis), Indiana from January 1970 through De-
cember 1976.17 We collected data on 176 forcible sex offenses, 373 prop-
erty offenses, and 396 other violent crimes. 8 The classification of crimes
was based on the most serious charge filed by the prosecutor. To avoid
confounding effects, analysis excludes sexual assaults that occurred in
conjunction with property crimes (e.g., burglary) or other violent of-
fenses (e.g., robbery).
We collected the demographic characteristics of victims and de-
fendants from police, prosecution, and court records; evidence from
prosecution files; criminal histories of victims and defendants from po-
lice records; and final dispositions from court records. Qualitative data,
17 The data gathered were identical but two sampling frames were used. Sexual assault
cases constitute the population of sexual assaults prosecuted between 1970 and 1976. Property
and other violent crime cases were part of a larger sample of cases disposed of between Janu-
ary 1974 and June 1976. The sampling percentage for cases disposed of in 1974 was 16.7%;
for 1975, 33.3%; and for 1976, 50%.
18 Sexual assaults include assault and battery with intent to rape or gratify (27.8%), forci-
ble rape (67.6%), and sodomy (4.6%). Other violent crimes include felonious assaults (16.7%),
robbery (70.2%), and homicide (13.1%). Property crimes include larceny (15.8o), vehicle
theft (11.1%), forgery (13.1%), and burglary (60.1%).
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derived from telephone interviews with victims, field observations, and
interviews with prosecutor and court personnel, supplemented case-spe-
cific data.
B. VARIABLES
Table 1 presents the dependent and independent variables. Analy-
sis focuses on four central decisions about the application of the criminal
law. The first two decisions simultaneously determine the treatment the
defendant receives and the allocation of scarce court resources.19 They
are Dismissal (the decision to dismiss rather than fully prosecute the
case) and Trial (the decision to plead guilty rather than proceed to
trial)*2O The third dependent variable is Verdict (not guilty or guilty).
For these outcomes, issues of evidentiary strength and victim credibility
are important.2 1 Thus, differences that are presumed to exist between
sexual assault and other crimes should be particularly salient here. The
final dependent variable is Sentence. Because most sentences are inde-
terminate, we examine type of sentence, whether a prison term or less
serious sanction such as probation or a fine.
The analysis includes four sets of independent variables identified
by prior research as possible determinants of reactions to sexual as-
sault.2 2 Coding of these variables conformed as closely as possible to
categories used in prior research.
19 See, e.g., Myers & Hagan, Private and Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the Allocation of Court
Resources, 26 Soc. PROBS. 439 (1979).
20 The decision to plead guilty differs from other outcomes because it is a jointly negoti-
ated decision reached through the initiative of the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the de-
fendant. Our concern lies with the outcomes of this process which, despite this difference,
have been found to depend on many of the same factors as other outcomes analyzed here.
See, e.g., J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); L. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? THE PROCESS OF
CRIMINAL-CASE DISPOSITION (1979); P. NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANI-
ZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978). For this reason and because it has
significant implications for both defendants and official agents, the decision to proceed to trial
rather than plead guilty is included here.
21 See, e.g., L. MATHER, sufira note 20; F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO
CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969); P. NARDULLI, supra note 20; D. NEUBAUER,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN MIDDLE AMERICA (1974); A. ROsET & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY
CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE (1976).
22 See, e.g., M. AMIR, supra note'14; S. BROWNMILLER, su/rra note 6; L. CLARK & D.
LEWIS, supra note 3; L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, supra note 3; A. MEDEA & K. THOMP-
SON, AGAINST RAPE (1974); Amir, Victim Precipitated Forcible Rape, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 492
(1967); Burt & Albin, supra note 7; Feild,Juror Backqround Characteristics and Attitudes toward
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The first set includes social attributes of victim, namely, sex, age,
employment status, and marital status.23 Marital status is a two vector
dummy variable that compares married victims with victims who are
either single (S) or separated, divorced, or cohabiting (SDC). Because
the victim's character and conduct have been central to descriptions of
rape prosecution, we also include resistance and alleged misconduct. Al-
leged misconduct is dummy-coded as two vectors comparing victims
with no alleged misconduct and victims with non-sexual (e.g., prior con-
victions, prior arguments with defendant) and sexual (e.g., illegitimate
children, premarital sex) misconduct. 24
The second set of independent variables consists of defendant at-
tributes, namely, gender, age, employment status, 25 and prior criminal
record. The third set of independent variables taps the interpersonal
and physical context in which the crime occurred. It includes the prior
victim-defendant relationship, racial composition of the victim-defend-
ant dyad, scene of the offense, number of accomplices and victims, use of
a weapon, and extent of physical injury. Racial composition is a two-
vector dummy variable that compares black intraracial incidents (BB)
with both white intraracial (WW) and black defendant-white victim in-
cidents (BW).26 Weapon is a two-vector dummy variable comparing
defendants using no weapons with those using hands, fists, and feet
(HFF) and a dangerous weapon (DW) such as a knife, blunt instrument,
or firearm.
The final set of variables, evidence, has received little explicit atten-
tion in the rape literature. But the context of typical sexual assaults
often render determinations of criminality and culpability problematic.
All analyses27 include the following direct or indirect indicators of the
evidentiary strength of the prosecution's case: the number of charges
and witnesses; eyewitness identifications of the defendant; expert testi-
23 Since extremely young and old witnesses may appear sympathetic and elicit more se-
vere responses, the effects of age could be curvilinear. To examine this possibility, age was
dichotomized and dummy coded (under 17 or over 59 = 0; 17 to 59 = 1). To test for curvilin-
earity, the dummy variable was entered into regression equations that contained the in-
dependent variables, including the interval measure of age. No increment in R 2 was
significant. We therefore report results from the models excluding the dummy variable.
24 While it would have been preferable to examine the effect of each type of allegation
separately, extremely skewed distributions dictated collapsing information on alleged miscon-
duct into a single measure. An alternative measure, the number of allegations of victim mis-
conduct, produced substantially the same results.
25 Unlike victim marital status, defendant marital status was not consistently recorded,
and could not be included in the analysis.
26 The few white defendant-black victim incidents (N = 13) could not be successfully
included in the analysis and were deleted.
27 Evidence continues to affect decisions even after conviction. See, e.g., J. EISENSTEIN &




mony from physicians, psychiatrists, ballistics experts, and polygraph
examiners; defendant/accomplice and witness statements about the
crime; and the amount of physical or real evidence such as recovered
weapons or stolen property.
C. SUBSAMPLE DIFFERENCES
Recent theorizing assumes that, as a crime, sexual assault differs
from other offenses. We examined this assumption by using chi-square
and, for interval variables, t-tests to test for the significance of differ-
ences between sexual assault and (1) other violent crime and (2) prop-
erty crime. Table 1 reports the results of these tests, and supports the
assumption of differences between sexual assaults and other crimes.
While most characteristics differ for sexual assault in comparison with
other crime, several of these differences confirm more specific assump-
tions about sexual assault cases and their victims.
While equally likely to be fully prosecuted, sexual assault is more
likely than property crime to proceed to trial. It is less likely than either
property or other violent crime to result in a guilty verdict or a prison
sentence. Thus, on the surface, there appears to be some leniency to-
ward defendants accused of sexual assault.
The victim's behavior, such as resistance and sexual misconduct, is
more commonly noted for sexual assault than for other crime. In com-
parison with other victims, sexual assault victims are more likely to be
younger, unemployed, single, and known to the defendant, as well as
more likely to report physical injury. Their cases are more likely to in-
volve eyewitness identifications of the defendant, expert testimony, and
additional charges but they are less likely to involve real evidence and
statements from witnesses or defendants/accomplices.
In short, the data confirm the assumption that sexual assault differs
from other crimes along dimensions relevant to official agents (e.g., vic-
tim credibility, evidence). But the feminist-conflict approach assumes
not only that these differences exist, but also that they provide grounds
for different official reactions. The following analysis indicates that this
latter assumption is incorrect.
D. ANALYSIS
The questions we are addressing require an analytic strategy that
allows us to determine (1) whether outcomes for sexual assault cases dif-
fer significantly from outcomes for other criminal cases; and (2) whether
the determinants of outcomes for sexual assault cases differ significantly
from the determinants of outcomes for other criminal cases-that is,
whether there are significant interactions between type of crime and the
1290 [Vol. 73
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independent variables. To answer these questions, we used ordinary
least squares multiple regression.28 This technique permits us to analyze
the relationship between a dependent variable (here, outcomes) and a
set of independent variables. It provides two important types of esti-
mates. The first type, the regression coefficient (in metric form, b; in
standardized form, 3), estimates the unique contribution each in-
dependent variable makes to predicting the dependent variable. A re-
gression coefficient permits us to infer whether the independent variable
signifcantly affects the outcome while also telling us the direction (posi-
tive or negative) and magnitude (strong or relatively modest) of the ef-
fect. The second type of estimate, the coefficient of determination (R2),
indicates the overall contribution which the independent variables,
taken together, make to predicting the dependent variable. It tells us
the proportion of the total variation in outcome that is explained by the
independent variables.
We used multiple regression procedures to draw five comparisons.
The first two were general comparisons between defendants accused of
sexual assault and those accused of (1) all other violent crimes and (2)
property crimes. The three remaining comparisons were more specific,
and were drawn between defendants accused of sexual assault and those
accused of (3) other kinds of assaults, (4) robbery, and (5) burglary.29
For all five comparisons, the same general procedure was followed.
Initially, we inspected correlation matrices for the presence of correla-
tions among the independent variables that exceeded ±.6. Such correla-
tions could generate multicollinearity problems during analysis, and
require deletion of redundant variables. We found no problematic
correlations.
We then created product terms by multiplying a dummy variable,
type of crime (e.g., sexual assault = 1; other violent crime = 0), with
each independent variable. These product or interaction terms permit
us to explore whether the effect of an independent variable upon an
outcome differs by type of crime, either sexual assault or other offense.
This exploration required that we estimate and compare two separate
regression equations. The first equation included all independent vari-
28 We used the multiple regression program available through Statistical Analysis Systems
(SAS). Because dependent variables are binary and violate technical assumptions of heteros-
kedasticity, ordinary least squares could produce inefficient, though unbiased, parameter esti-
mates. For an extended discussion, see D. Cox, ANALYSIS OF BINARY DATA(1970); E.
HANUSHEK &J. JACKSON, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (1977). We ran
a weighted least squares solution for all analyses but found it unsuitable for the relatively
small samples involved because it produced extremely high coefficients of determination and
standard errors.




ables entered together. The second equation included all independent
variables and product terms, also entered simultaneously. We then
compared the coefficients of determination obtained in the two equa-
tions to test the null hypothesis that the addition of product terms pro-
duced no significant (p .05) increase in the proportion of explained
variation in outcome.30
If the addition of product terms produced no significant increase in
explained variance, we concluded that there is an essential similarity in
the prosecution of sexual assault and the other crime under considera-
tion (e.g., other violent crime, property crime, robbery). Where this oc-
curred, Appendix tables report results of an additive model that
includes the independent variables and the dummy variable, type of
crime.
If the addition of product terms significantly increased the propor-
tion of variance explained, we concluded that significant differences in
prosecution exist. We then attempted to locate the sources of the differ-
ences. We did this by locating significant product terms. A significant
(p .10) product term means that the effect the variable has on out-
come differs by crime, whether a sexual assault or another offense.
Where this is the case, tables include separate regression estimates for
sexual assault and for the other crime.31 In contrast, an insignificant
product term means that the regression coefficient for sexual assault
does not significantly differ from the regression coefficient for the other
crime under consideration. In these cases, we concluded that the varia-
ble in question has essentially the same effect on outcome for both
groups of defendants, those accused of sexual assault and those accused
of the other crime. We then report only the main effect. The statistical
30 The test for the significance of the increment in explained variance is
(R- - R) / (k i - ka)F (1- R j) /(N - ki)
where R is the coefficient of determination for the interactive model, R 2 is the coefficient of
determination for the additive model, ki = number of regressors, interactive model, ka =
number of regressors, additive model, and N is the total number of cases.
31 For an independent variable whose product term was significant, we could not assume
(as we did for variables with insignificant product terms) that the regression coefficient ob-
tained for the variable estimates its effect on outcomes for both groups of defendants, that is,
for both those accused of sexual assaults and those accused of other crimes. Rather, the coeffi-
cient estimates the variable's effect on outcomes only for defendants accused of sexual assault,
that is, defendants whose cases were coded 0 in the dummy variable, type of crime. To esti-
mate the variable's effect on outcomes for defendants accused of other crimes, we reversed the
dummy variable coding so that the cases of defendants accused of other crimes received a
value of zero. We then recalculated the product terms and reran the interactive model. The
resulting coefficient for the variable is its estimated effect on outcomes for defendants accused
of other crimes, and is reported in the appropriate column of the table.
1292 [Vol. 73
SEXUAL ASSA UL T
program also tests the hypothesis that each regression coefficient differs
significantly from zero, and all tables report the results of those tests.
We modified the equations slightly in the following instances. First,
in comparing sexual assault with property crime, we excluded two in-
dependent variables, physical injury and weapon, because extremely
skewed distributions prevented construction of meaningful product
terms. Second, analyses for Verdict and Sentence included control vari-
ables of particular relevance to these outcomes. Equations predicting
Verdict included the number of prior convictions, a measure which is
more appropriate than that shown in Table 1. Equations for Verdict
also included a dummy variable, type of trial (bench = 0; jury = 1).
Finally, comparisons for Sentence included type of plea (not guilty = 0;
guilty = 1).
III. RESULTS
A. SEXUAL ASSAULT VS. OTHER VIOLENT CRIME
Table 2 summarizes the results for comparisons drawn between de-
fendants accused of sexual assault and those accused of other violent
crimes. For three of the four outcomes, Dismissal, Trial, and Verdict,
the addition of product terms failed to increase the proportion of ex-
plained variance significantly. Thus, there is no evidence that in terms
of reaching these decisions sexual assault cases are treated differently
from cases involving other violent crimes. The Appendix presents and
discusses the results of additive models for these outcomes.
TABLE 2
COEFFICIENTS OF DETERMINATION AND RELATED STATISTICS FOR
SEXUAL ASSAULT VS. OTHER VIOLENT CRIME COMPARISONS
DISMISSAL TRIAL VERDICT SENI'ENCE
Additive Interactive Additive Interactive Additive Interactive Additive Interactive
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model
R2  .099 .154 .140 .201 .169 .338 .230 .323
F-ratio 2.05 1.70 2.43 1.87 1.35 1.44 3.62 2.71
P .001 .002 .0001 .0004 .127 .042 .0001 .0001
N 572 572 464 464 215 215 381 381
Note: The F-ratio tests the null hypothesis that the proportion of explained variation in
outcome (R2 or the coefficient of determination) is equal to zero, and that any ob-
served proportion is due to sampling fluctuation or measurement error. Where the F-
ratio obtained has a low probability (p) of occurring, it is unlikely that the null hy-
pothesis is true. Concretely, we can conclude that independent variables as a set ex-
plain a significant proportion of the variance in outcome.
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For the fourth outcome, Sentence, the addition of product terms
significantly increased the proportion of explained variance, and pro-
vides evidence of different treatment. But as Table 3 shows, different
treatment does not occur where we expected it. That is, victim attrib-
utes and behavior do not play a more prominent role in the sentencing
of offenders convicted of sexual assault. Rather, defendant characteris-
tics (employment status), the context of the offense (use of a weapon),
and evidence (witnesses and eyewitness identification) affected sentences
differently, depending on whether the offender was convicted of a sexual
assault or of another violent crime. Thus, for sexual assault offenders,
imprisonment was more likely where the offender was unemployed or
where there were numerous witnesses. In contrast, these factors had no
effect on the sentencing of other violent offenders. Instead, for offenders
convicted of other violent crimes, use of a dangerous weapon increased
their risk of imprisonment, while eyewitness identification decreased
that risk.
It is important, however, to place the differences noted above in
context. The majority of variables had essentially the same effect on the
sentences of both groups of offenders. Of the victim attributes and be-
haviors, only gender and alleged misconduct significantly affected sen-
tencing by rendering imprisonment more likely where the victim was a
woman or had allegedly engaged in nonsexual misconduct. Of defend-
ant characteristics, only prior record affected sentences, with a more se-
rious prior record increasing the probability of imprisonment. A single
contextual factor, racial composition, had a significant effect. Imprison-
ment was more likely where the defendant was black and the victim
white. Only two evidence measures, defendant or accomplice state-
ments and witness statements, significantly affected sentences. In cases
involving statements from the defendant or accomplices, imprisonment
was more likely, while in cases involving witness statements, imprison-
ment was less likely. Finally, imprisonment was more likely for defend-
ants found guilty at trial.
B. SEXUAL ASSAULT VS. PROPERTY CRIME
Table 4 summarizes the results for comparisons drawn between de-
fendants accused of sexual assault and those accused of property crimes.
For three of the four outcomes, Dismissal, Verdict, and Sentence, the
addition of product terms did not significantly increase the proportion
of explained variance. The Appendix presents and discusses the results
of additive models for these outcomes.
For one outcome, Trial, the addition of product terms significantly
increased the proportion of explained variance, providing evidence of
1294 [Vol. 73
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TABLE 3
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF
INTERACTIVE MODEL COMPARING SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH OTHER
VIOLENT CRIME: SENTENCE
SIGNIFIcANTLY DIFFERENT PRoDuCT TERMS
MAIN EFFECTS Sexual Assault Other Violent Crime
VARIABLE b(SE) b(SE) b(SE)
Victim Characteristics
Sex-. 155(.06 5)b
Age .004(005) -. 002(.002)
Employment Status -. 080(.110)
Marital Status
Other (0) vs. S(l) -. 068(.082)
Other (0) vs. SDC(l) --.060(.092)
Resistance .026(.080)
Alleged Misconduct
Other (0) vs. Non-sexual (I) .143(078)-










Other (0) vs. BW(l) .141(.079)-
Other (0) vs. WW(I) .034(.074)
Scene -. 031(.092)
Accomplices .014(.030)
Victims -. 272(.182) .064(.058)
Weapons
Other (0) vs. HFF(I) -. 144(.105) .129(.129)




Witnesses .0 78 (.0 37)b -. 055(.016)
Eyewitness Identification .083(.094) -. 109(. 047)b
Expert Testimony .048(.062)
Witness Statements -. 104(.064)'
Defendant/Accomplice
Statement .199(. 0 78)b
Real Evidence .036(.038)
Plea .102(.061)
Intercept -. 177(.548) .744(.361)
b
Note: b refers to the unstandardized or metric coefficient and SE to its standard error.




COEFFICIENTS OF DETERMINATION AND RELATED STATISTICS FOR
SEXUAL ASSAULT VS. PROPERTY CRIME COMPARISONS
DISMISSAL TRIAL VERDICT SENI-EN(:I
Additive Interactive Additive Interactive Additive Interactive Additive Interactive
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model
R2  .099 .136 .142 .223 .298 .447 .213 .262
F-ratio 2.29 1.60 2.77 2.31 1.90 1.41 3.77 2.35
P .0004 .008 .0001 .0001 .012 .081 .0001 .0001
N 549 549 444 444 138 138 390 390
Note: The F-ratio tests the null hypothesis that the proportion of explained variation in
outcome (R 2 or the coefficient of determination) is equal to zero, and that any ob-
served proportion is due to sampling fluctuation or measurement error. Where the F-
ratio obtained has a low probability (p) of occurring, it is unlikely that the null hy-
pothesis is true. Concretely, we can conclude that independent variables as a set ex-
plain a significant proportion of the variance in outcome.
different treatment. Table 5 presents results of the interactive model for
this outcome. Once again, different treatment does not occur where we
expected it, namely, in a more pronounced effect for victim attributes
and behaviors on the outcomes of sexual assault cases. Rather, the ef-
fects of crime context and evidence differed depending on the crime.
For defendants accused of sexual assault, trial was less likely for white vs.
white crimes, or where there were numerous victims, relatively few wit-
nesses, and real evidence. This was not the case for defendants accused
of property crimes, who were more likely to go to trial where the crime
was black vs. white, or where there were numerous charges32 or victims.
Again, several variables had essentially the same effect for both
groups of defendants. In general, defendants who were older, employed,
had serious prior records, or had used accomplices were more likely to
go to trial, as were those whose cases involved expert testimony.
C. SEXUAL ASSAULT VS. SPECIFIC OFFENSES
To conserve space, we discuss the results of comparisons drawn be-
tween sexual assault and other assaults, robbery and burglary, only if
32 Unlike defendants accused of property crimes, those accused of sexual assault had fewer
opportunities to plea bargain for sentence considerations because additional charges tended
to be equally or only slightly less serious than the first charge. For example, a typical addi-
tional charge for rape was sodomy, while a typical additional charge for armed rape was rape.
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statistically significant differences are present.33 This was the case only
for the sentencing of sexual assault and robbery offenders, where the
addition of product terms significantly increased the proportion of ex-
plained variance (from twenty-five percent to thirty-eight percent). Ta-
ble 6 presents these results. It shows no tendency for victim attributes or
behaviors to figure more prominently when sentencing sexual assault
offenders. Rather, for these offenders, imprisonment was more likely if
the defendant was unemployed or if there were numerous charges and
witnesses. For offenders convicted of robbery, these factors were irrele-
vant, and alleged sexual misconduct by the victim reduced the risk of
imprisonment while use of a dangerous weapon increased that risk.
In contrast to the more general comparisons, only two variables
(defendant or accomplice statements and plea) had essentially similar
effects for both groups of offenders. Both the presence of defendant or
accomplice statements and conviction at trial increased the probability
of imprisonment.
IV. DISCUSSION
Recent feminist-conflict research has assumed that sexual assaults
differ qualitatively from other crimes and, thus, that official reactions to
sexual assaults and other crimes differ. Our analysis showed that al-
though there are striking differences between sexual assaults and other
crimes in terms of the characteristics of victims, defendants, and evi-
dence, these differences were not consistently translated into different of-
ficial reactions. Nor were they consistently translated into the use of
markedly different criteria to decide outcomes. Victim attributes and
behaviors did affect court outcomes for the various types of crime ex-
amined, but they did not have a different or greater impact on the out-
comes of sexual assault cases. Moreover, indicators of victim sexual-
property value (e.g., marital status, age) and sex-role conformity (e.g.,
alleged sexual misconduct, reported resistance) did not affect reactions
to sexual assaults differently from reactions to other felonies.
Different treatment of sexual assaults did occur. It was limited,
however, to differential sentencing in comparison to violent crime and
robbery, and to the differential decision to proceed to trial in compari-
son to property crime. Primary differences in official reactions centered
not on victim characteristics per se, but rather on evidentiary
33 Interested readers may request the results of comparisons that produced no significant
differences.
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TABLE 5
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF








Other (0) vs. S(1)
Other (0) vs. SDC(l)
Resistance
Alleged Misconduct
Other (0) vs. Non-sexual (1)










Other (0) vs. BW(I)















Note: b refers to the unstandardi
- .05<p<.10




















Sexual Assault Property Crime
b(SE) b(SE)
-. 096(.115)
















- 1.0 75(.3 4 4 )b
zed or metric coefficient and SE to its standard error.
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TABLE 6
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF








Other (0) vs. S (1)
Other (0) vs. SDC (1)
Resistance
Alleged Misconduct
Other (0) vs. Nonsexual (1)









Other (0) vs. BW (1)





Other (0) vs. HFF (1)





































.16 1(.0 6 3)b












.18 7(.0 9 1)b
.027(.039)
Plea
Intercept -. 232(.416) .977(.429)b
Note: b refers to the unstandardized or metric coefficient and SE to its standard error.
a.05 < p <.10
bp < .05
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considerations. Here, the results suggest that officials face unique evi-
dentiary problems when processing sexual assaults. The differential im-
portance of real evidence, eyewitness identification, and the number of
witnesses and victims reflects a concern with consent and identification,
two issues that are especially problematic for sexual assaults. 34 Even
though corroboration is not formally required. in the jurisdiction stud-
ied, the findings suggest that such a requirement persists on an informal
level. This informal requirement could reflect an underlying official
skepticism toward sexual assault complaints. But while such skepticism
may exist, officials do not appear to rely on the victim's sexual property
value and sex-role conformity when deciding what official action is ap-
propriate. Rather, officials base their decisions on the context within
which the crime occurred, and its ability to generate evidence that aids
or precludes resolution of consent and identification issues (e.g., eyewit-
ness identification).
Furthermore, even these differences in treatment must be inter-
preted in the context of substantial cross-crime similarity. To some ex-
tent, victim and defendant attributes, the context of the crime, and
evidentiary strength affected official reactions, regardless of the crime
involved and the specific prosecution problems each type of crime may
present.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The fact that we found few significant differences in the processing
of sexual assaults is noteworthy given previous research. 35 Most of the
variables examined here were included in these earlier studies, and we
did succeed in coding variables in similar categories. Moreover, most
prior research focused on court outcomes, as did we. Thus, we all have
had to deal with the issue of prior screening. But unlike prior research,
our design explicitly compared sexual assault with other crimes, and did
so in a multivariate framework that included measures of evidence. The
most plausible explanation for the similarities in prosecution we found,
then, is that at least in the jurisdiction studied these crimes are processed
34 See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 2; Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analsis of Corroboration, Consent and Charac-
ter, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309 (1973); LeGrand, supra 6; Schwendinger & Schwendinger, Rape
Myths: In Legal, Theoretical and Eveyday Practice, CRIME & SOC. JUST. (Spr.-Sum. 1974), at 18;
Comment, Forcible and Statutoy Rape, An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent
Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55 (1952).
35 See, e.g., L. CLARK & D. LEWIS, supra note 3; L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, supra note
3; H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 11; Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation.: Rape Cases
in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. (1977); Bohmersupra note 7; Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice
Traumatized- Rape Victim and the Court, 58 JUDICATURE 390 (1975); Note, supra note 6.
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in a more similar manner than prior research has assumed or has been
able to determine.
Clearly, it remains the task for future research to determine
whether this conclusion holds for earlier (e.g., police) stages of prosecu-
tion or for other jurisdictions. Our findings do suggest, however, that it
may be simplistic to assume that officials who process sexual assaults are
guided by a set of concerns that are unique to sexual assault and invari-
ant across decisionmaking contexts. While our findings do not support a
recommendation to abandon the search for differences in official reac-
tions, they do recommend an expansion of the feminist-conflict perspec-
tive in three directions. First, theorizing may profit by extending
concern beyond the victim and her experiences as a witness to the con-
text within which the sexual assault occurred. The context of the crime
and its ability to produce evidence of legal guilt appear to be particu-
larly important during official processing. Second, theorizing should re-
flect greater attentiveness to the decision making context itself. Since
different treatment did not occur at all stages of prosecution, theorists
need to identify differences in these stages (e.g., norms, participants, pri-
orities) that may shape and constrain differential responses to sexual as-
sault. Finally, the results underscore the importance of placing sexual
assault in a broader comparative framework. The uniqueness of official
reactions to sexual assault becomes apparent only after comparison with
reactions to other crimes. Only by such explicit comparisons can theo-
rists specify similarities and differences among crimes and among official
reactions to them, modifying where necessary their underlying implicit
assumptions.
Conversely, the existence of different treatment, while limited, also
challenges traditional criminological assumptions. As noted earlier,
traditional research has implicitly assumed that the crucial difference
among crimes and official reactions to crimes is the quantitative one of
seriousness. The results of our study suggest the need to explore differ-
ences along the qualitative dimension, particularly those bearing on the
nature of evidence needed and used to determine guilt and punishment.
This exploration, in turn, implies greater attentiveness toformal defini-
tions of crime. These formal definitions specify the unique "elements"
of criminal action and, through this specification, shape the role that the
characteristics of victims, defendants, and evidence play when the crimi-




Appendix Table I presents the results of additive models for two
outcomes, Dismissal and Trial, for which there were no significant dif-
ferences between sexual assaults and other violent crime. The third out-
come, Verdict, will be neither presented nor discussed because its
coefficient of determination was statistically insignificant.
Dismissal was affected by three of the six victim attributes: employ-
ment status, marital status, and alleged misconduct. Case dismissal was
less likely if the victim was unemployed or separated, divorced, or co-
habiting, and more likely if the victim had allegedly engaged in nonsex-
ual misconduct. In contrast, defendant characteristics were irrelevant to
this decision. Of the context variables, both racial composition and
scene of offense had significant effects. Dismissal was more likely in
black vs. black crimes or if the crime occurred in the victim's residence.
Of the evidence measures, eyewitness identifications, defendant or ac-
complice statements, and real evidence all decreased the probability a
case would be dismissed.
For fully prosecuted cases, the decision to go to trial rather than
accept a plea of guilty was unaffected by victim attributes and behavior.
Rather, this Trial decision depended on defendant characteristics (age
and prior record), the context of the offense (use of accomplices or a
weapon), and evidence (expert testimony, witness statements, and real
evidence). Defendants who were older, had serious prior records, used
accomplices, or used a weapon were more likely to go to trial, as were
those whose cases involved expert testimony, witness statements, and lit-
tle real evidence.
Appendix Table 2 presents the results of additive models for three
outcomes (Dismissal, Verdict, and Sentence), for which there were no
significant differences between sexual assaults and property crimes.
Focusing first on Dismissal, Table 2 shows that this outcome depends on
victim characteristics (employment status, resistance), defendant charac-
teristics (employment status), and evidence (charges, witnesses, and real
evidence). Dismissal was less likely if the victim was unemployed or re-
ported resisting the defendant; if the defendant was unemployed; or if
there were numerous charges, numerous witnesses, and real evidence.
Among cases that went to trial, the Verdict was affected by a single
victim attribute (sex), defendant characteristics (employment status,
prior convictions), the context of the crime (racial composition), and evi-
dence (defendant or accomplice statements). Defendants were more
likely to be found guilty if the victim was a woman; if the defendant
1302 [Vol. 73
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF ADDITIVE
MODELS FOR SEXUAL ASSAULTS AND OTHER VIOLENT CRIMES:
DISMISSAL AND TRIAL
Y,: DISMISSAL Y2: TRIAL
Variable b(SE) 13 B(SE) 13
Victim Characteristics
Sex .013(.044) .017 .082(.062) .081
Age -. 001(.001) -. 031 -. 001(.002) -. 046
Employment Status -. 099 (.04 8)b -. 1 10b .089(.070) .078
Marital Status
Other (0) vs. S(1) .026(.047) .032 .012(.067) .011
Other (0) vs. SDC (1) .101(.056)a .082a .023(.077) .015
Resistance .005(.041) .005 -. 008(.058) -. 007
Alleged Misconduct
Other (0) vs. Non-sexual (1) -. 082(.044)a  -. 094a .056(.063) .049
Other (0) vs. Sexual (I) .019(.065) .013 .109(.090) .062
Defendant Characteristics
Sex -. 159(.112) -. 061 -. 120(.148) -. 038
Age -.003(.002) -.064 .010 (.003)b .162b
Employment Status .042(.036) .054 .025(.050) .025
Prior Record -. 014(.015) -. 045 .038(.020)a .093a
Context
Victim-defendant
Relationship -. 017(.035) -. 028 .003(.048) .004
Racial Composition
Other (0) vs. BW (1) .100(.0 44)b .1 16 b .003(.062) .002
Other (0) vs. WW (1) .08 7(.040)b .108
b  
-. 071(.057) -. 069
Scene .079(.046)a  .080a  -. 035(.066) -. 027
Accomplices .025(.018) .067 .05 2 (.024 )b .111
b
Victims -. 026(.031) -. 054 .001(.046) .001
Weapons
Other (0) vs. HFF (I) .003(.056) .003 .17 3(.079 )b .126b
Other (0) vs. DW (I) .054(.048) .067 .197(. 0 68)b .1901
Injury .021(.030) .067 .029(.041) .045
Evidence
Charges -. 022(.026) -. 047 -. 018(.037) -. 026
Witnesses -. 002(.009) -. 012 .007(.014) .028
Eyewitness Identification .056 (.02 7)b .0 9 2b .055(.039) .071
Expert Testimony .019(.028) .033 .073(.041)a .097a
Witness Statements .036(.041) .045 .108(.057)a .108 a
Delendant/Accomplice
Statements .088(.053)a .082a -. 082(.071) -. 064
Real Evidence .06 9(.024)b . 136 b -. 053(.032)a -. 084
a
Type of Crime -. 008(.068) -. 009 -. 042(.098) -. 039
Intercept -. 370(.209) a  - 1.15(. 28 9)b
Note: b refers to the unstandardized or metric coefficient and SE to its standard error.
SD,
13 refers to a standardized coefficient, derived by using the following algorithm: 13 = b ( -D), where b is
Y
the metric coefficient, SD. is the standard deviation of the independent variable, and SD is the standard
deviation of the dependent variable. Within each equation, standardized coefficients may be compared to
obtain a sense of the relative magnitude of the effect each independent variable has on the outcome.
Across equations, the unstandardized coefficients for each independent variable may be compared to
obtain a sense of the effect the same variable has on different outcomes.
a.05 < p <.10
bp .05
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF ADDITIVE
MODELS FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT AND PROPERTY CRIME: DISMISSAL,
VERDICT, AND SENTENCE
DISMISSAL VERDICT SENTENCE






Other (0) vs S(1)
Other (0) vs. SDC(l)
Resistance
Alleged Misconduct
Other (0) vs. Nonsexual (1)









Other (0) vs. BW (1)















.054(.050) .069 -. 3 6 4 (.125)b -. 3 88 b -. 106(.072) -. 106
.001(.001) .049 .001(.003) .044 .000(.002) .005
-.101(.051)b -. 11 1b .000(.112) .000 .088(.075) .078
.046(.057) .053 .197(.145) .206 -. 127(.084) -. 116
.051(.069) .035 -. 085(.147) -. 059 -. 108(.100) -. 058
.085(.052)a .082a -. 125(.107) -. 120 -. 086(.076) -. 064
-. 074(.047) -. 069 -. 100(.117) -. 079 .013(.071) .009
.050(.067) .035 .137(.136) .105 -. 045(.098) -. 025
-. 017(.103) .008 --- __c .3 0 6 (.14 0 )b .1 14b
-. 001(.002) -. 028 .000(.006) .005 .000(.003) .004
-.139(.035)b -. 170
b  
-. 145(.084)a -. 150 a  -.150(.0 5 0)b -. 14 8b
.001(.015) .004 .026(.015)a .189 a  .09 4 (.02 2 )b .23 1b
-. 041(.035) -. 059 .055(.080) .075 .092(.051) a  .103 a
-. 057(.051) -. 063 .188(.120) .183 .146(.077) a  .127
a
.003(.045) .044 .22 3 (.010)b .2 4 1b .103(.065) .013
-. 012(.039) -. 015 -. 063(.098) -. 067 -. 089(.056) -. 086
.021(.016) .061 .030(.033) .092 -. 040(.023) a  -. 093 a
-. 027(.045) -. 032 .011(.104) .011 -. 030(.068) -. 028
.06 6 (.030)b .103b -. 025(.067) -. 035 .058(.046) .074
.019(.012)- .077- .036(.028) .136 .037(.017)a .119a
.028(.030) .045 .090(.072) .126 . 10 3 (.0 4 4 )b . 13 0b
.022(.033) .036 .008(.070) .013 .027(.050) .031
.035(.038) .077 -. 041(.111) -. 039 -. 067(.052) -. 074
.050(.050) .051 .2 8 0 (.12 8 )b .2 14 b -. 015(.067) -. 013




.015(.083) .018 .318(.215) .343 .086(.124) .079
.094(.061) .081
Type of Trial -. 091 (.093) -. 096
Intercept -. 123(.197) -. 643(.448) -. 003(.292)
Note: b refers to the unstandardized or metric coefficient and SE to its standard error.
SD,,13 refers to a standardized coefficient, derived by using the following algorithm: 13 b SD.)' where b is
the metric coefficient, SDy is the standard deviation of the independent variable, and SD , is the standard
deviation of the dependent variable. Within each equation, standardized coefficients may be compared to
obtain a sense of the relative magnitude of the effect each independent variable has on the outcome.
Across equations, the unstandardized coefficients for each independent variable may be compared to
obtain a sense of the effect the same variable has on different outcomes.
a.05 < p < .10
bp <! .05
cInsufficient variation to include.
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was unemployed or had prior convictions; if the crime was white vs.
white; and if there were defendant or accomplice statements.
Finally, Sentence was unaffected by victim attributes and behavior.
Rather, the probability of imprisonment depended on several defendant
characteristics (sex, employment status, prior record), the context of the
crime (victim-defendant relationship, racial composition, accomplices),
and evidence (witnesses, eyewitness identification, and real evidence).
Imprisonment was more likely if the defendant was male, unemployed,
or had a serious prior record; if the crime involved strangers, blacks vs.
whites, and no accomplices; or if there were numerous witnesses, eyewit-
ness identifications of the defendant, and little real evidence.
